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Abstract—In this work, we consider achievable secrecy rates
for symmetric K-user (K ≥ 3) interference channels with
confidential messages. We find that nested lattice codes and
layered coding are useful in providing secrecy for these channels.
Achievable secrecy rates are derived for very strong interference.
In addition, we derive the secure degrees of freedom for a range
of channel parameters. As a by-product of our approach, we
also demonstrate that nested lattice codes are useful for K-user
symmetric interference channels without secrecy constraints in
that they yield higher degrees of freedom than previous results.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a wireless environment, interference is always present.
Traditionally, interference is viewed as a harmful physical
phenomenon that should be avoided. Yet, from the secrecy
perspective, if interference is more harmful to an eavesdropper,
it can be a resource to protect confidential messages. To fully
appreciate and evaluate the potential benefit of interference
to secrecy, the fundamental model to study is the interference
channel with confidential messages. This model with two users
has been investigated extensively up to date, e.g., [1]–[3].
The K-user (K ≥ 3) interference channel, when all link
coefficients are i.i.d. fading, has been studied both with and
without secrecy constraints [4], [5]. In these references, the
key ingredient for achievability is interference alignment in
temporal domain. For the case without secrecy constraints,
reference [4] proves the degree of freedom characterization to
be K/2 for the sum rate.
For the static channel without secrecy constraints, [6] shows
the degrees of freedom can not exceed K/2, though whether
this bound is achievable remains elusive except for when the
channel gains of the intended links are algebraic irrational and
the other channel gains are rational numbers [7]. References
[8], [9] show K/2 can be approached asymptotically for a
static K-user symmetric channel if the channel gain of the
interfering link goes to 0 or ∞. Both [8] and [9] employ the
idea of interference alignment in the signal space: Reference
[8] uses the Q-bit expansion and reference [9] uses the lattice
code with a sphere as the shaping set [10].
For the static channel with confidential messages, the prob-
lem of finding the secure degrees of freedom has largely
remained unaddressed so far. In this paper, we focus on
the K-user (K ≥ 3) interference channel with confidential
messages, where each receiver is an eavesdropper with respect
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Fig. 1. K-User Symmetric Interference Channel, K = 3
to messages not intended for it. We first derive achievable rates
using nested lattice codes for very strong interference. We then
investigate the secure degrees of freedom of the sum rate for
this channel. We show that positive secure degrees of freedom
are achievable, made possible by the fact that users can protect
each other via cooperative jamming [11]. Inspired by [9], a
layered encoding and decoding scheme is used. The achieved
secure degrees of freedom is roughly half of the achievable
degrees of freedom in the model without secrecy constraints
and is achievable for both weak and strong interference regime.
The key ingredient is a tool first introduced in [12] which
allows us to bound the secrecy rates under nested lattice codes.
As a by-product of our approach, we also show that for the
case without secrecy constraints, a degree of freedom higher
than found in [8], [9] is achievable. The main reason leading to
this improvement is the use of the nested lattice codes instead
of sphere-shaped lattice codes as in [9]. This leads to different
decodability conditions and power allocation among different
layers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we describe the system model. In Section III, we derive
the very strong interference condition and the corresponding
achievable secrecy rates. Section IV presents the achievable
degrees of freedom for the sum rate and the sum secrecy rate
and compares it with previous results. Section V concludes
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the Gaussian interference channel shown in
Figure 1 for K = 3. The average power constraint for each
source node Si is P . Zi, i = 1, ...,K are independent Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance. The
channel gain coefficient between Si and Di is b, while the
channel gain coefficient between Si and Dj , i 6= j is 1.
Node Si tries to send a secret message Wi to node Di, while
keeping it secret from all the other receiving nodes Dj , j 6=
i. Hence, for W2, ...,WK , node D1 is viewed as a potential
eavesdropper. Let the signal received by D1 over N channel
uses be Y N1 . The corresponding secrecy constraint is given by:
lim
N→∞
1
N
H
(
W2, ...,WK |Y N1
)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
H (W2, ...,WK)
(1)
The secrecy constraints due to node D2, ..., DK are defined in
a similar fashion.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATES UNDER VERY STRONG
INTERFERENCE
In this section, we summarize several key steps of the
achievability proof and derive the very strong interference
condition. For clarity, we focus on K = 3. The scheme is
applicable to K > 3 as well.
We note that the achievable scheme is similar to that of
the many-to-one interference channel [13]. However, because
of the increased connections in the network, the very strong
interference condition shall differ from that of [13].
A. Source Node
Let (Λ,Λc) be a nested lattice structure in RN , where Λc is
the coarse lattice. The modulus operation x mod Λc is defined
as x mod Λc = x−argminy∈Λc d(x, y), where d(x, y) is the
Euclidean distance between x and y. The fundamental region
V(Λc) of the lattice Λc is defined as the set {x : x mod Λc =
x}.
The ith source node constructs its input to the channel over
N channel uses, XNi , as follows: Let ti ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λc). Let di
be the dithering noise that is uniformly distributed over V(Λc).
Then XNi = (tNi + dNi ) mod Λc.
We assume the dithering noise di is known by all destination
nodes.
B. Destination Node
Because of the symmetry of the channel, without loss of
generality, we focus on the first destination node D1. The
destination first decodes the modulus sum of the interference,
and then decodes its intended message.
The signal received by D1 over N channel uses is:
Y N1 = bX
N
1 + (X
N
2 +X
N
3 ) + Z
N
1 (2)
Node 1 tries to decode tN2 + tN3 mod Λc. Although XN1
is not Gaussian, it can be approximated by a Gaussian distri-
bution as N → ∞, as shown in [14, (82)] or [13, (15)-(21)].
Hence we can apply the analysis in [14, Theorem 5], that the
probability of decoding error will go to 0 as N →∞ when
R ≤ 0.5 log2
(
1
2
+
P
b2P + 1
)
(3)
With the knowledge of tN2 + tN3 mod Λc, node 1 can recon-
struct XN2 + X
N
3 mod Λc. After subtracting this term from
Y N1 mod Λc, the rest part of the interference signal is(
bXN1 + Z
N
1
)
mod Λc (4)
Then, it can be shown [14, (89)] [13, (27)] that if
b2P + 1 < P (5)
then this signal can be approximated by
bXN1 + Z
N
1 (6)
That is to say:
lim
N→∞
Pr(bXN1 + Z
N
1 6= bXN1 + ZN1 mod Λc) = 0 (7)
Finally, the destination tries to decode t1 from (6). Based
on [14, Theorem 5], the probability of decoding error will go
to zero as N →∞, if
R < C(b2P ) (8)
In summary, if (3), (5) and (8) hold, then the decoding error
probability at node 1 should vanish as N →∞.
C. Equivocation Rate
The computation of the equivocation rate is the same as
[13], as shown below:
H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |Y N1 , dNi , i = 1, 2, 3
) (9)
≥H (tN2 , tN3 |Y N1 , XN1 , ZN1 , dNi , i = 1, 2, 3) (10)
=H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |XN2 +XN3 , dNi , i = 1, 2, 3
) (11)
In [12, Theorem 1], it is proved that we can find an integer
T1, 1 ≤ T ≤ 2N , such that XN2 +XN3 is uniquely determined
by {XN2 +XN3 mod Λc, T1}. Using this result, (11) equals
H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |XN2 +XN3 mod Λc, T1, dNi , i = 1, 2, 3
) (12)
=H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc, T1, dNi , i = 1, 2, 3
) (13)
=H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc, T1
) (14)
=H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc
)
+H
(
T1|tN2 , tN3
)
−H (T1|tN2 + tN3 mod Λc) (15)
≥H (tN2 , tN3 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc)−H (T1) (16)
The first term in (16) can be bounded as follows:
H
(
tN2 , t
N
3 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc
) (17)
=H
(
tN2 |tN2 + tN3 mod Λc
)
+H
(
tN3 |tN2 , tN2 + tN3 mod Λc
)
= H
(
tN2
)
= NR (18)
where R is the rate of the codebook computed as R =
1
N
log2 ‖Λ ∩ V (Λc)‖.
Hence the mutual information leaked to the eavesdropper is
bounded as:
I
(
tN2 , t
N
3 ;Y
N
1 , d
N
i , i = 1, 2, 3
) ≤ N(R+ 1) (19)
Intuitively, this means each pair of users have to pay R+1 in
rate to confuse the eavesdropper. Under a symmetric setting
each user loses 0.5R+0.5 in rate. This leaves room of 0.5R−
0.5 for each user to send the secret message, which leads to
the following theorem:
Theorem 1: For any R,P, b such that (3), (5) and (8) hold,
a secrecy rate of [0.5R− 0.5]+ is achievable for each user. If
b2 ≤ min{P − 1
P
,
√
P + 116 − 34
P
} (20)
then R = C(b2P ).
Remark 1: Under this condition on b2, it can be verified
(3) and (5) become redundant. Hence the secrecy rate is given
when R is selected to be C(b2P ).
Remark 2: Reference [15] considers the 3 user symmetric
interference channel without secrecy constraints. A different
lattice structure is used [10], where V(Λc) is replaced by a
sphere or a sphere shell. After power normalization, the very
strong interference condition of [15] can be expressed as
b2 ≤
√
P − 1
P
(21)
Comparing (21) with (20), we notice (20) is slightly looser.
Hence, using a nest lattice structure allows a slightly wider
range of channel parameter under which the channel has very
strong interference.
D. K > 3
Theorem 1 can be extended to the case with more than 3
users. In this case, The achievable rate becomes
[
R− R
K − 1 −
log2(K − 1)
K − 1
]+
(22)
Equation (3) becomes
R ≤ 0.5 log2
(
1
K − 1 +
P
b2P + 1
)
(23)
Hence, the very strong interference condition (20) becomes
b2 ≤ min{P − 1
P
,
√
P − c+ (c+1)24 − c+12
P
} (24)
where c = K−2
K−1 .
Remark 3: It is then interesting to look at the behavior of
the secrecy rate when the number of users K → ∞ in the
very strong interference channel. From (22), the secrecy rate
will converge to R. This means the cost of secrecy per user
vanishes. A similar phenomenon is also observed in [13] for
the many-to-one interference channel.
IV. SECURE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
In this section, we derive the achievable secure degrees
of freedom for a given channel gain b. Like [9], a layered
lattice structure is used. However, instead of the spherical
code, the nested lattice code is used in order to leverage the
representation theorem [12] to bound the secrecy rate.
A. Source Node
Due to symmetry, we focus on source node 1. The trans-
mitted signal is the sum of signals from different layers. The
signal from the ith layer over N channel uses, XN1 , is given
by
XN1 =
M∑
i=1
XN1,i (25)
where, like [9], the total number of levels M is to be
determined by total power. X1,i is the signal for the ith level,
which is given by:
XN1,i = (t
N
1,i + d
N
1,i) mod Λc,i (26)
where dN1,i is the dithering noise uniformly distributed over
V (Λc,i). We assume the dithering noise for each level at each
source node is independent from each other. tN1,i is taken from
the Voronoi code book Λi ∩ V (Λc,i), where the variance of
V (Λc,i) is chosen to be Pi. Let the rate of this codebook be
Rk,i for the kth user.
B. Destination Node
1) Strong Interference Regime: Like [9], we first examine
the case where the destination node decodes the interference
first, and then decodes the intended signals. The case where
the destination decodes the intended signals first can be
analyzed in the similar fashion. Due to symmetry, we focus
on destination node D1. For the ith layer, the destination node
decodes the modulus sum of the interference, subtracts it, then
decodes the signal from source node S1. Suppose decoding for
all layers j, j > i, are successful, and the modulus operation at
layer j incurs negligible distortion for signals at lower layers.
Then the remaining signal after subtracting the decoded signals
can be approximated by:
Y N1,i = bX
N
1,i +X
N
2,i +X
N
3,i
+
∑
1≤j<i
(
XN2,j +X
N
3,j
)
+
∑
1≤j<i
(
bXN1,j
)
+ ZN1 (27)
Define Ai such that
Ai =
∑
1≤j<i
(2Pj) +
∑
1≤j<i
(
b2Pj
)
+ 1 (28)
The decoder then decodes tN2,i+ tN3,i mod Λc,i. The decoding
error will decrease exponentially with the dimension of the
lattice N if the lattice is designed properly and
Ri ≤ 0.5 log2

 Pi
PI,iPS,i
PI,i+PS,i

 (29)
where PI,i, PS,i are the power of the interference and the
signal respectively:
PI,i = b
2Pi +Ai, PS,i = 2Pi (30)
This means that
Ri ≤ 0.5 log2
(
1
2
+
Pi
b2Pi +Ai
)
(31)
After decoding (tN2,i + tN3,i) mod Λc,i, node D1 subtracts
(tN2,i + d
N
2,i + t
N
3,i + d
N
3,i) mod Λc,i from Y N1,i mod Λc,i. The
signal after the subtraction is given by:
Yˆ N1,i = (bX
N
1,i +
∑
1≤j<i
(
XN2,j +X
N
3,j
)
+
∑
1≤j<i
(
bXN1,j
)
+ ZN1 ) mod Λc,i (32)
When
Pi > PI,i (33)
Yˆ N1,i can be approximated by
bXN1,i +
∑
1≤j<i
(
XN2,j +X
N
3,j
)
+
∑
1≤j<i
(
bXN1,j
)
+ ZN1 (34)
The decoder then decodes tN1,i from (34). The decoding error
will decrease exponentially with the dimension of the lattice
N if the lattice is designed properly as in [14] and
Ri ≤ 0.5 log2

 b2PiP ′
I,i
P ′
S,i
P ′
I,i
+P ′
S,i

 (35)
where
P ′I,i = Ai, P
′
S,i = b
2Pi (36)
This means that
Ri ≤ 0.5 log2
(
1 +
b2Pi
Ai
)
(37)
The decoder will then subtract b(tN1,i + dN1,i mod Λc,i) from
(34) and proceed to decode the lower layers.
We next derive the power allocation among different layers.
Like [9], we choose Pi such that the right hand sides of (31)
and (37) are equal. This means that
1
2
+
Pi
b2Pi + Ai
= 1 +
b2Pi
Ai
(38)
It is easy to check that (38) leads to:
Pi =
2− 3b2 +√4− 12b2 + b4
4b4
Ai (39)
For Pi to be a real number, we require 4 − 12b2 + b4 > 0.
This, along with the fact that Ai > 0, means
b2 < 6− 4
√
2 (40)
which is about 0.34315. Define
α =
2− 3b2 +√4− 12b2 + b4
4b4
, β = b2 + 2 (41)
Then P1 = α and
Pi = α

β ∑
1≤j<i
Pj + 1

 , i > 1 (42)
Therefore
Pi = α (αβ + 1)
i−1 (43)
The power expended by each user is given by
P =
M∑
i=1
Pi =
(αβ + 1)
M − 1
β
(44)
Since αβ > 0, we have limM→∞ P =∞.
Under this power allocation, R1,i is given by
R1,i =
0.5
2
log2
(
1
2
+
Pi
b2Pi +Ai
)
+
0.5
2
log2
(
1 +
b2Pi
Ai
)
(45)
=
1
2
(
0.5 log2
(
Ai+1
Ai
)
− 0.5
)
(46)
Therefore
M∑
i=1
R1,i =
1
2 (0.5 log2 (AM+1)− 0.5M).
Let Rk denote the rate of the k user. Hence, Rk =
M∑
i=1
Rk,i, k = 1, 2, 3. If there is no secrecy constraints, the
degree of freedom is given by
lim
P→∞
3∑
k=1
Rk
1
2 log2
(
3∑
i=1
Pi
) =1.5− lim
M→∞
1.5M
log2 P
(47)
=1.5− 1.5
log2 (αβ + 1)
(48)
Let Re,k denote the rate of the k user. When there are secrecy
constraints, each layer can support a secrecy rate of [0.5R1,i−
0.5]+. The secure degrees of freedom is given by
lim
P→∞
3∑
i=1
Re,i
1
2 log2
(
3∑
i=1
Pi
) ≥ lim
M→∞
3×
(
M∑
i=1
(0.5R1,i − 0.5)
)
1
2 log2 (3P )
(49)
=
3
4
− 3.75
log2 (αβ + 1)
(50)
We still need to check if the condition (33) are met. Under
the current power allocation, we have
Ai = (αβ + 1)
i−1 (51)
(33) means
Pi ≥ b2Pi +Ai (52)
Hence we require
(1− b2)α ≥ 1 (53)
which holds when (40) holds. In summary, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 2: If b2 < 6 − 4√2, the following degrees of
freedom for the sum rate is achievable:
1.5− 1.5
log2 (αβ + 1)
(54)
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Moreover, the following degrees of freedom for the sum
secrecy rate is achievable:[
3
4
− 3.75
log2 (αβ + 1)
]+
(55)
2) Weak Interference Regime: When the intended signal
is strong enough, the destination should decode it first, and
then decode the interference later. In this case, (30) and (36)
become
PI,i = 2Pi +Ai, PS,i = b
2Pi (56)
P ′I,i = Ai, P
′
S,i = 2Pi (57)
Equation (38) becomes
1 +
b2Pi
2Pi +Ai
=
1
2
+
Pi
Ai
(58)
This means Pi is given by (43) with α given below
α = 0.25
(
b2 +
√
b4 + 4
)
(59)
and β remains as b2 + 2.
In order for the modulus operation to introduce negligible
distortion to lower layers, we require
Pi > P
′
I,i (60)
This translates into α > 1. This means b2 > 3/2. Hence, we
have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: If b2 > 3/2, then the degrees of freedom given
by (54) and secure degrees of freedom given by (55) are
achievable, where α is given by (59) and β = b2 + 2.
3) Numerical Results: As shown in Figure 2, when b2 →
∞ or b2 → 0, the secure degrees of freedom converge to 34 ,
which is half the secure degrees of freedom achievable in the
model without secrecy constraints.
Also compared in Figure 2 are the degrees of freedom when
there are no secrecy constraints. The black dashed lines show
the degrees of freedom from [9] using a sphere shaped lattice
code. The blue dotted line denotes the degrees of freedom
achieved by the Q-bit expansion method in [8], which is
K
2 (1− logb (2K)), where K = 3 in Figure 2. The blue lines
are the degrees of freedom achieved by our proposed scheme
using the nested lattice code. We see that it consistently
outperforms the scheme from [9] when b2 < 6 − 4√2 or
when 3/2 < b2 < 8.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered the symmetric K-user
(K ≥ 3) interference channel with or without confidential
messages. We have derived the very strong interference con-
dition and the achievable secrecy rates. We have also derived
the achievable degrees of freedom for the sum rate and the
secrecy sum rate. Both results use nested lattice codes and
are shown to outperform previous results. We conclude that
nested lattice codes are useful for providing secrecy for K-user
interference channels with confidential messages, and improve
upon the previous constructions in degrees of freedom for K-
user interference channels without secrecy constraints.
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